Notice that the trailing colon is required. The resulting public key is stored in file PublicKeyFile. Similarly, the resulting private key is stored in file PrivateKeyFile. Either of the filenames can be specified to be -, in which case the corresponding key(s) will be printed in standard output.
The optional parameters print-offset and print-length specify the offset from the beginning of the line where the key will be printed, and the number of characters of the key that will be printed per line. print-length includes AlgorithmName for the first line and has to be longer (by at least 2) than AlgorithmName. print-length also accounts for the line-continuation character (backslash) at the end of each line, and the doublequotes at the beginning and end of the key encoding. Default values are 12 and 50 respectively.
"keynote sign" reads the assertion contained in AssertionFile and generates a signature specified by AlgorithmName using the private key stored in PrivateKeyFile. The private key is expected to be of the form output by "keynote keygen". The private key algorithm and the AlgorithmName specified as an argument are expected to match. There is no requirement for the internal or ASCII encodings to match. Valid AlgorithmName identifiers are:
Notice that the trailing colon is required. The resulting signature is printed in standard output. This can then be added (via cut-and-paste or some script) at the end of the assertion, in the Signature field.
The public key corresponding to the private key in PrivateKeyFile is expected to already be included in the Authorizer field of the assertion, either directly or indirectly (i.e., through use of a Local-Constants attribute). Furthermore, the assertion must have a Signature field (even if it is empty), as the signature is computed on everything between the KeyNote-Version and Signature keywords (inclusive), and the AlgorithmName string.
If the -v flag is provided, "keynote sign" will also verify the newly-created signature using the Authorizer field key.
The optional parameters print-offset and print-length specify the offset from the beginning of the line where the signature will be printed, and the number of characters of the signature that will be printed per line. print-length includes AlgorithmName for the first line and has to be longer (by at least 2) than AlgorithmName. print-length also accounts for the line-continuation character (backslash) at the end of each line, and the doublequotes at the beginning and end of the signature encoding. Default values are 12 and 50 respectively.
"keynote sigver" reads the assertions contained in AssertionFile and verifies the public-key signatures on all of them.
For each operand that names a "keynote verify" reads the file and parses the assertions contained therein (one assertion per file).
Files given with the -l flag are assumed to contain trusted assertions (no signature verification is performed, and the Authorizer field can contain non-key principals. There should be at least one assertion with the POLICY keyword in the Authorizer field.
The -r flag is used to provide a comma-separated list of return values, in increasing order of compliance from left to right.
Files given with the -e flag are assumed to contain environment variables and their values, in the format:varname = "value"
varname can begin with any letter (upper or lower case) or number, and can contain underscores. value is a quoted string, and can contain any character, and escape (backslash) processing is performed, as specified in the KeyNote RFC.
The remaining options are:
-h Print a usage message and exit. -k file Add a key from file in the action authorizers.
Exactly one -r and least one of each -e , -l , and -k flags should be given per invocation. If no flags are given, "keynote verify" prints the usage message and exits with error code -1.
"keynote verify" exits with code -1 if there was an error, and 0 on success.
keynote(3), keynote(4), keynote(5)
The KeyNote Trust-Management System, Version 2 M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, A. D. Keromytis, Internet Drafts, RFC 2704. Decentralized Trust Management M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, J. Lacy, 1996 IEEE Conference on Privacy and Security Compliance-Checking in the PolicyMaker Trust Management System M. Blaze, J. Feigenbaum, M. Strauss, 1998 Financial Crypto Conference
Angelos D. Keromytis (email@example.com)
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