By default, ssh looks for id_dsa, id_rsa, id_ecdsa_key, known_hosts, and authorized_keys in ~/.ssh, and for the host key files in /etc/ssh. These locations can be changed by the options user_dir and system_dir.
Public key handling can also be customized through a callback module that implements the behaviors ssh_client_key_api and ssh_server_key_api.
id_dsa, id_rsa and id_ecdsa are the users private key files. Notice that the public key is part of the private key so the ssh application does not use the id_<*>.pub files. These are for the users convenience when it is needed to convey the users public key.
The known_hosts file contains a list of approved servers and their public keys. Once a server is listed, it can be verified without user interaction.
The authorized_key file keeps track of the users authorized public keys. The most common use of this file is to let users log in without entering their password, which is supported by the Erlang ssh daemon.
RSA and DSA host keys are supported and are expected to be found in files named ssh_host_rsa_key, ssh_host_dsa_key and ssh_host_ecdsa_key.
The ssh application uses the default OTP error logger to log unexpected errors or print information about special events.
The supported SSH version is 2.0.
The actual set of algorithms may vary depending on which OpenSSL crypto library that is installed on the machine. For the list on a particular installation, use the command ssh:default_algorithms/0. The user may override the default algorithm configuration both on the server side and the client side. See the option preferred_algorithms in the ssh:daemon/1,2,3 and ssh:connect/3,4 functions.
Supported algorithms are:
Key exchange algorithms:
* ecdh-sha2-nistp256 * ecdh-sha2-nistp384 * ecdh-sha2-nistp521 * diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha1 * diffie-hellman-group-exchange-sha256 * diffie-hellman-group14-sha1 * diffie-hellman-group1-sha1
Public key algorithms:
* ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 * ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 * ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 * ssh-rsa * ssh-dss
* hmac-sha2-256 * hmac-sha2-512 * hmac-sha1
Encryption algorithms (ciphers):
* firstname.lastname@example.org (AEAD_AES_128_GCM) * email@example.com (AEAD_AES_256_GCM) * aes128-ctr * aes192-ctr * aes256-ctr * aes128-cbc * 3des-cbc
Following the internet de-facto standard, the cipher and mac algorithm AEAD_AES_128_GCM is selected when the cipher firstname.lastname@example.org is negotiated. The cipher and mac algorithm AEAD_AES_256_GCM is selected when the cipher email@example.com is negotiated.
See the text at the description of the rfc 5647 further down for more information.
* none * firstname.lastname@example.org * zlib
Unicode filenames are supported if the emulator and the underlaying OS support it. See section DESCRIPTION in the file manual page in kernel for information about this subject.
The shell and the cli both support unicode.
The following rfc:s are supported:
* RFC 4251, The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture.
* 9.4.6 Host-Based Authentication * 9.5.2 Proxy Forwarding * 9.5.3 X11 Forwarding
* RFC 4252, The Secure Shell (SSH) Authentication Protocol.
* 9. Host-Based Authentication: "hostbased"
* RFC 4253, The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol.
* RFC 4254, The Secure Shell (SSH) Connection Protocol.
* 6.3. X11 Forwarding * 7. TCP/IP Port Forwarding
* RFC 4256, Generic Message Exchange Authentication for the Secure Shell Protocol (SSH).
* num-prompts > 1 * password changing * other identification methods than userid-password
* RFC 4419, Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol.
* RFC 4716, The Secure Shell (SSH) Public Key File Format.
* RFC 5647, AES Galois Counter Mode for the Secure Shell Transport Layer Protocol.
There is an ambiguity in the synchronized selection of cipher and mac algorithm. This is resolved by OpenSSH in the ciphers email@example.com and firstname.lastname@example.org which are implemented. If the explicit ciphers and macs AEAD_AES_128_GCM or AEAD_AES_256_GCM are needed, they could be enabled with the option preferred_algorithms.
Warning:If the client or the server is not Erlang/OTP, it is the users responsibility to check that other implementation has the same interpretation of AEAD_AES_*_GCM as the Erlang/OTP SSH before enabling them. The email@example.com variants are always safe to use since they lack the ambiguity.
The second paragraph in section 5.1 is resolved as:
* If the negotiated cipher is AEAD_AES_128_GCM, the mac algorithm is set to AEAD_AES_128_GCM. * If the negotiated cipher is AEAD_AES_256_GCM, the mac algorithm is set to AEAD_AES_256_GCM. * If the mac algorithm is AEAD_AES_128_GCM, the cipher is set to AEAD_AES_128_GCM. * If the mac algorithm is AEAD_AES_256_GCM, the cipher is set to AEAD_AES_256_GCM.
The first rule that matches when read in order from the top is applied
* RFC 5656, Elliptic Curve Algorithm Integration in the Secure Shell Transport Layer.
* 5. ECMQV Key Exchange * 6.4. ECMQV Key Exchange and Verification Method Name * 7.2. ECMQV Message Numbers * 10.2. Recommended Curves
* RFC 6668, SHA-2 Data Integrity Verification for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol
Comment: Defines hmac-sha2-256 and hmac-sha2-512
|Ericsson AB||SSH (7)||ssh 4.2.2|