|whitelist||appears if the global /usr/local/dcc/whiteclnt or per-user file marks the message as good.|
|brand||is the "brand name" of the DCC server, such as "RHYOLITE".|
|client||is the name or IP address of the DCC client that added the header line to the SMTP message.|
|server-ID||is the numeric ID of the DCC server that the DCC client contacted.|
|bulk||is present if one or more checksum counts exceeded the DCC clients thresholds to make the message "bulky."|
|bulk rep||is present if the DCC reputation of the IP address of the sender is bad.|
|cknm1, cknm2, ...||are types of checksums:|
|IP||address of SMTP client|
|env_From||SMTP envelope value|
|From||SMTP header line|
|Message-ID||SMTP header line|
|Received||last Received: header line in the SMTP message|
|substitute||SMTP header line chosen by the DCC client, prefixed with the name of the header|
|Body||SMTP body ignoring white-space|
|Fuz1||filtered or "fuzzy" body checksum|
|Fuz2||another filtered or "fuzzy" body checksum|
|rep||DCC reputation of the mail sender or the estimated probability that the message is bulk.|
|count||is the total number of recipients of messages with that checksum reported directly or indirectly to the DCC server. The special count "MANY" means that DCC client have claimed that the message is directed at millions of recipients. "MANY" imples the message is definitely bulk, but not necessarily unsolicited. The special counts "OK" and "OK2" mean the checksum has been marked "good" or "half-good" by DCC servers.|
Legitimate mailing list traffic differs from spam only in being solicited by recipients. Each client should have a private whitelist.
DCC whitelists can also mark mail as unsolicited bulk using blacklist entries for commonly forged values such as "From: email@example.com".
DCC server and client whitelist files share a common format. Server files are always named whitelist and one is required to be in the DCC home directory with the other server files. Client whitelist files are named /usr/local/dcc/whiteclnt in the DCC home directory or a per-user subdirectory of the directory specified with the -U option for dccm(8) or dccifd(8). They specify mail that should not be reported to a DCC server or that is always unsolicited and almost certainly bulk.
A DCC whitelist file contains blank lines, comments starting with "#", and lines of the following forms:
include file Copies the contents of file into the whitelist. It cannot occur in an included file. The file name is relative to the DCC home directory if not absolute.
count value lines specify checksums that should be white- or blacklisted. count env_From 821-path
count env_To dest-mailbox
count From 822-mailbox
count Message-ID <string>
count Received string
count Substitute header string
count Hex ctype cksum
count IP hosts
MANY value indicates that millions of targets have received messages with the header, IP address, or checksum value. OK value
say that messages with the header, IP address, or checksum value are OK and should not reported to DCC servers or be greylisted. OK2 says that the message is "half OK." Two OK2 checksums associated with a message are equivalent to one OK.
A DCC server never shares or floods reports containing checksums marked in its whitelist with OK or OK2 to other servers. A DCC client does not report or ask its server about messages with a checksum marked OK or OK2 in the client whitelist. This is intended to allow a DCC client to keep private mail so private that even its checksums are not disclosed.
MX IP hosts
MXDCC IP hosts
mark an IP address or block of addresses of trusted mail relays including MX servers, smart hosts, and bastion or DMZ relays. The DCC clients dccm(8), dccifd(8), and dccproc(8) parse and skip initial Received: headers added by listed MX servers to determine the external sources of mail messages. Unsolicited bulk mail that has been forwarded through listed addresses is discarded by dccm(8) and dccifd(8) as if with -a DISCARD instead of rejected. MXDCC marks addresses that are MX servers that run DCC clients. The checksums for a mail message that has been forwarded through an address listed as MXDCC are queried instead of reported by a DCC client.
dccd(8) treats MXDCC and MX lines in the /usr/local/dcc/whitelist file as if they were OK lines.
SUBMIT IP hosts marks an IP address or block of addresses of SMTP submission clients such as web browsers that cannot tolerate 4yz temporary rejections but that cannot be trusted to not send spam. Since they are local addresses, DCC Reputations are not computed for them.
dccd(8) ignores SUBMIT lines in the /usr/local/dcc/whitelist file.
value in count value lines can be
dest-mailbox is an RFC 821 address or a local user name. 821-path is an RFC 821 address. 822-mailbox is an RFC 822 address with optional name. Substitute header is the name of an SMTP header such as "Sender" or the name of one of two SMTP envlope values, "HELO," or "Mail_Host" for the resolved host name from the 821-path in the message. Hex ctype cksum starts with the string Hex followed a checksum type, and a string of four hexadecimal numbers obtained from a DCC log file or the dccproc(8) command using -CQ . The checksum type is body, Fuz1, or Fuz2 or one of the preceding checksum types such as env_From. hosts is a host name, an IPv4 or IPv6 address, a block of IP addresses specified as starting and ending addresses separated by a dash (-), or a block in the standard xxx/mm form. A host name is converted to IP addresses with DNS, the /etc/hosts file, or other mechanisms.
The /usr/local/dcc/whitelist file used by the DCC server. dccd(8), treats all host names, IP addresses, and address blocks the same. Each IP address must be added to the DCC database as its checksum. DCC servers only hear about checksums and so could not use a list of IP addresses. To prevent accidentally adding billions of records to the database (contemplate a line like "OK IP fe80::0/120), server whitelist entries cannot specify blocks larger than 65,536 or /16.
The DCC clients, dccifd(8), dccm(8) or dccproc(8), know about IP addresses and so their whitelists can contain IP addresses. The global /usr/local/dcc/whiteclnt file or a per-user whiteclnt file can contain up to 64 ranges of 256 or more IP addresses. Smaller ranges are added as individual entries.
option setting can only be in a DCC client whiteclnt file used by dccifd(8), dccm(8) or dccproc(8). Settings in per-user whiteclnt files override settings in the global /usr/local/dcc/whiteclnt file. Setting can be any of the following: option log-all to log all mail messages. option log-normal to log only messages that meet the logging thresholds. option log-subdirectory-day
puts log files for mail messages in subdirectories of the userdirs/addr/log directory specified with -U userdirs for dccm(8) or dccifd(8). The subsdirectories are of the form JJJ, JJJ/HH, or JJJ/HH/MM where JJJ is the current julian day, HH is the current hour, and MM is the current minute. See also -l logdir for dccm(8), dccifd(8), and dccproc(8). option DCC-on
to control DCC filtering. option greylist-on
to control greylisting if enabled in dccm(8) or dccifd(8) with -G . Greylisting for other recipients in the same SMTP transaction can still cause greylist temporary rejections. option greylist-ignore-spam-on
causes greylisting to ignore the results of other filters. If off, spam is rejected regardless of greylist embargoes and future embargoes for the sending IP address are restored or reset. If this option is on, greylist delays or embargoes are required before spam is rejected and future embargoes on spam sending IP addresses are not reset. option greylist-log-on
to control per-user logging of greylisted mail messages. Logging of greylisted messages in the main log directory is not affected. option DCC-rep-off
to honor or ignore DCC Reputations computed by the DCC server. option DNSBL1-off
honor or ignore results of DNS blacklist checks configured with -B for dccm(8), dccifd(8), and dccproc(8). option MTA-first
consider MTA determinations of spam or not-spam first so they can be overridden by whiteclnt files, or last so that they can override whiteclnt files. option forced-discard-ok
control whether dccm(8) and dccifd(8) are allowed to discard a message for one mailbox for which it is spam when it is not spam and must be delivered to another mailbox. This can happen if a mail message is addressed to two or more mailboxes with differing whitelists. Discarding can be undesirable because false positives are not communicated to mail senders. To avoid discarding, dccm(8) and dccifd(8) running in proxy mode temporarily reject SMTP envelope Rcpt To values that involve differing whiteclnt files. option threshold type,rej-thold has the same effects as -c type,rej-thold for dccproc(8) or -t type,rej-thold for dccm(8) and dccifd(8). It is useful only in per-user whiteclnt files to override the global DCC checksum thresholds. option spam-trap-discard
say that mail should be reported to the DCC server as extremely bulk or with target counts of MANY. Greylisting, DNS blacklist (DNSBL), and other checks are turned off. Spam-trap-discard tells the MTA to accept the message while spam-trap-reject tells the MTA to reject the message. Use Spam-trap-discard for spam traps that should not be disclosed. Spam-trap-reject can be used on catch-all mailboxes that might receive legitimate mail by typographical errors and that senders should be told about. option not-spam-trap turns off spam-trap-discard and spam-trap-reject.
In the absence of explicit settings, the default in the main whiteclnt file is equivalent to
The defaults for individual recipient whiteclnt files are the same except as change by explicit settings in the main file.
Checksums of the IP address of the SMTP client sending a mail message are practically unforgeable, because it is impractical for an SMTP client to "spoof" its address or pretend to use some other IP address. That would make the IP address of the sender useful for whitelisting, except that the IP address of the SMTP client is often not available to users of dccproc(8). In addition, legitimate mail relays make whitelist entries for IP addresses of little use. For example, the IP address from which a message arrived might be that of a local relay instead of the home address of a whitelisted mailing list.
Envelope and header From values can be forged, so whitelist entries for their checksums are not entirely reliable.
The DCC server, dccd(8), can be used to maintain a greylist database for some DCC clients including dccm(8) and dccifd(8). Greylisting involves temporarily refusing mail from unfamiliar SMTP clients and is unrelated to filtering with a Distributed Checksum Clearinghouse.
Because sending mail is a less private act than receiving it, and because sending bulk mail is usually not private at all and cannot be very private, the DCC tries first to protect the privacy of mail recipients, and second the privacy of senders of mail that is not bulk.
DCC clients necessarily disclose some information about mail they have received. The DCC database contains checksums of mail bodies, header lines, and source addresses. While it contains significantly less information than is available by "snooping" on Internet links, it is important that the DCC database be treated as containing sensitive information and to not put the most private information in the DCC database. Given the contents of a message, one might determine whether that message has been received by a system that subscribes to the DCC. Guesses about the sender and addressee of a message can also be validated if the checksums of the message have been sent to a DCC server.
Because the DCC is distributed, organizations can operate their own DCC servers, and configure them to share or "flood" only the checksums of bulk mail that is not in local whitelists.
DCC clients should not report the checksums of messages known to be private to a DCC server. For example, checksums of messages local to a system or that are otherwise known a priori to not be unsolicited bulk should not be sent to a remote DCC server. This can accomplished by adding entries for the sender to the clients local whitelist file. Client whitelist files can also include entries for email recipients whose mail should not be reported to a DCC server.
Whenever considering security, one must first consider the risks. The worst DCC security problems are unauthorized commands to a DCC service, denial of the DCC service, and corruption of DCC data. The worst that can be done with remote commands to a DCC server is to turn it off or otherwise cause it to stop responding. The DCC is designed to fail gracefully, so that a denial of service attack would at worst allow delivery of mail that would otherwise be rejected. Corruption of DCC data might at worst cause mail that is already somewhat "bulk" by virtue of being received by two or more people to appear have higher recipient numbers. Since DCC users must whitelist all sources of legitimate bulk mail, this is also not a concern. Such security risks should be addressed, but only with defenses that dont cost more than the possible damage from an attack.
The DCC must contend with senders of unsolicited bulk mail who resort to unlawful actions to express their displeasure at having their advertising blocked. Because the DCC protocol is based on UDP, an unhappy advertiser could try to flood a DCC server with packets supposedly from subscribers or non-subscribers. DCC servers defend against that attack by rate-limiting requests from anonymous users.
Also because of the use of UDP, clients must be protected against forged answers to their queries. Otherwise an unsolicited bulk mail advertiser could send a stream of "not spam" answers to an SMTP client while simultaneously sending mail that would otherwise be rejected. This is not a problem for authenticated clients of the DCC because they share a secret with the DCC. Unauthenticated, anonymous DCC clients do not share any secrets with the DCC, except for unique and unpredictable bits in each query or report sent to the DCC. Therefore, DCC servers cryptographically sign answers to unauthenticated clients with bits from the corresponding queries. This protects against attackers that do not have access to the stream of packets from the DCC client.
The passwords or shared secrets used in the DCC client and server programs are "cleartext" for several reasons. In any shared secret authentication system, at least one party must know the secret or keep the secret in cleartext. You could encrypt the secrets in a file, but because they are used by programs, you would need a cleartext copy of the key to decrypt the file somewhere in the system, making such a scheme more expensive but no more secure than a file of cleartext passwords. Asymmetric systems such as that used in UNIX allow one party to not know the secrets, but they must be and are designed to be computationally expensive when used in applications like the DCC that involve thousands or more authentication checks per second. Moreover, because of "dictionary attacks," asymmetric systems are now little more secure than keeping passwords in cleartext. An adversary can compare the hash values of combinations of common words with /etc/passwd hash values to look for bad passwords. Worse, by the nature of a client/server protocol like that used in the DCC, clients must have the cleartext password. Since it is among the more numerous and much less secure clients that adversaries would seek files of DCC passwords, it would be a waste to complicate the DCC server with an asymmetric system.
The DCC protocol is vulnerable to dictionary attacks to recover passwords. An adversary could capture some DCC packets, and then check to see if any of the 100,000 to 1,000,000 passwords in so called "cracker dictionaries" applied to a packet generated the same signature. This is a concern only if DCC passwords are poorly chosen, such as any combination of words in an English dictionary. There are ways to prevent this vulnerability regardless of how badly passwords are chosen, but they are computationally expensive and require additional network round trips. Since DCC passwords are created and typed into files once and do not need to be remembered by people, it is cheaper and quite easy to simply choose good passwords that are not in dictionaries.
It is better to fail to filter unsolicited bulk mail than to fail to deliver legitimate mail, so DCC clients fail in the direction of assuming that mail is legitimate or even whitelisted.
A DCC client sends a report or other request and waits for an answer. If no answer arrives within a reasonable time, the client retransmits. There are many things that might result in the client not receiving an answer, but the most important is packet loss. If the clients request does not reach the server, it is easy and harmless for the client to retransmit. If the clients request reached the server but the servers response was lost, a retransmission to the same server would be misunderstood as a new report of another copy of the same message unless it is detected as a retransmission by the server. The DCC protocol includes transactions identifiers for this purpose. If the client retransmitted to a second server, the retransmission would be misunderstood by the second server as a new report of the same message.
Each request from a client includes a timestamp to aid the client in measuring the round trip time to the server and to let the client pick the closest server. Clients monitor the speed of all of the servers they know including those they are not currently using, and use the quickest.
Servers and clients use numbers or IDs to identify themselves. ID 1 is reserved for anonymous, unauthenticated clients. All other IDs are associated with a pair of passwords in the ids file, the current and next or previous and current passwords. Clients included their client IDs in their messages. When they are not using the anonymous ID, they sign their messages to servers with the first password associated with their client-ID. Servers treat messages with signatures that match neither of the passwords for the client-ID in their own ids file as if the client had used the anonymous ID.
Each server has a unique server-ID less than 32768. Servers use their IDs to identify checksums that they flood to other servers. Each server expects local clients sending administrative commands to use the servers ID and sign administrative commands with the associated password.
Server-IDs must be unique among all systems that share reports by "flooding." All servers must be told of the IDs all other servers whose reports can be received in the local /usr/local/dcc/flod file described in dccd(8). However, server-IDs can be mapped during flooding between independent DCC organizations.
Passwd-IDs are server-IDs that should not be assigned to servers. They appear in the often publicly readable /usr/local/dcc/flod and specify passwords in the private /usr/local/dcc/ids file for the inter-server flooding protocol
The client identified by a client-ID might be a single computer with a single IP address, a single but multi-homed computer, or many computers. Client-IDs are not used to identify checksum reports, but the organization operating the client. A client-ID need only be unique among clients using a single server. A single client can use different client-IDs for different servers, each client-ID authenticated with a separate password.
An obscure but important part of all of this is that the inter-server flooding algorithm depends on server-IDs and timestamps attached to reports of checksums. The inter-server flooding mechanism requires cooperating DCC servers to maintain reasonable clocks ticking in UTC. Clients include timestamps in their requests, but as long as their timestamps are unlikely to be repeated, they need not be very accurate.
DCC clients on a computer share information about which servers are currently working and their speeds in a shared memory segment. This segment also contains server host names, IP addresses, and the passwords needed to authenticate known clients to servers. That generally requires that dccm(8), dccproc(8), dccifd(8), and cdcc(8) execute with an UID that can write to the DCC home directory and its files. The sendmail interface, dccm, is a daemon that can be started by an "rc" or other script already running with the correct UID. The other two, dccproc and cdcc need to be set-UID because they are used by end users. They relinquish set-UID privileges when not needed.
Files that contain cleartext passwords including the shared file used by clients must be readable only by "owner."
The data files required by a DCC can be in a single "home" directory, /usr/local/dcc. Distinct DCC servers can run on a single computer, provided they use distinct UDP port numbers and home directories. It is possible and convenient for the DCC clients using a server on the same computer to use the same home directory as the server.
The DCC source distribution includes sample control files. They should be modified appropriately and then copied to the DCC home directory. Files that contain cleartext passwords must not be publicly readable.
The DCC source includes "feature" m4 files to configure sendmail to use dccm(8) to check a DCC server about incoming mail.
See also the INSTALL.html file.
Installing a DCC client starts with obtaining or compiling program binaries for the client server data control tool, cdcc(8). Installing the sendmail DCC interface, dccm(8), or dccproc(8), the general or procmail(1) interface is the main part of the client installation. Connecting the DCC to sendmail with dccm is most powerful, but requires administrative control of the system running sendmail.
As noted above, cdcc and dccproc should be set-UID to a suitable UID. Root or 0 is thought to be safe for both, because they are careful to release privileges except when they need them to read or write files in the DCC home directory. A DCC home directory, /usr/local/dcc should be created. It must be owned and writable by the UID to which cdcc is set.
After the DCC client programs have been obtained, contact the operator(s) of the chosen DCC server(s) to obtain each servers host name, port number, and a client-ID and corresponding password. No client-IDs or passwords are needed touse DCC servers that allow anonymous clients. Use the load or add commands of cdcc to create a map file in the DCC home directory. It is usually necessary to create a client whitelist file of the format described above. To accommodate users sharing a computer but not ideas about what is solicited bulk mail, the client whitelist file can be any valid path name and need not be in the DCC home directory.
If dccm is chosen, arrange to start it with suitable arguments before sendmail is started. See the homedir/dcc_conf file and the misc/rcDCC script in the DCC source. The procmail DCCM interface, dccproc(8), can be run manually or by a procmailrc(5) rule.
The DCC server, dccd(8), also requires that the DCC home directory exist. It does not use the client shared or memory mapped file of server addresses, but it requires other files. One is the /usr/local/dcc/ids file of client-IDs, server-IDs, and corresponding passwords. Another is a flod file of peers that send and receive floods of reports of checksums with large counts. Both files are described in dccd(8).
The server daemon should be started when the system is rebooted, probably before sendmail. See the misc/rcDCC and misc/start-dccd files in the DCC source.
The database should be cleaned regularly with dbclean(8) such as by running the crontab job that is in the misc directory.
cdcc(8), dbclean(8), dcc(8), dccd(8), dccifd(8), dccm(8), dccproc(8), dblist(8), dccsight(8), sendmail(8).
Distributed Checksum Clearinghouses are based on an idea of Paul Vixie with code designed and written at Rhyolite Software starting in 2000. This document describes version 1.3.158.