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NAME
SYNOPSIS
DESCRIPTIONSecurity Event Audit is a facility to provide fine-grained,
configurable logging of security-relevant events, and is intended to meet
the requirements of the Common Criteria (CC) Common Access Protection
Profile (CAPP) evaluation. The FreeBSD
Audit support is enabled at boot, if present in the kernel, using
an
rc.conf(5)
flag. The audit daemon,
auditd(8),
is responsible for configuring the kernel to perform
Audit Special DeviceThe kernel Audit Pipe Special DevicesAudit pipe special devices, discussed in auditpipe(4), provide a configurable live tracking mechanism to allow applications to tee the audit trail, as well as to configure custom preselection parameters to track users and events in a fine-grained manner. DTrace Audit ProviderThe DTrace Audit Provider, dtaudit(4), allows D scripts to enable capture of in-kernel audit records for kernel audit event types, and then process their contents during audit commit or BSM generation. SEE ALSOauditreduce(1), praudit(1), audit(2), auditctl(2), auditon(2), getaudit(2), getauid(2), poll(2), select(2), setaudit(2), setauid(2), libbsm(3), auditpipe(4), dtaudit(4), audit.log(5), audit_class(5), audit_control(5), audit_event(5), audit_user(5), audit_warn(5), rc.conf(5), audit(8), auditd(8), auditdistd(8) HISTORYThe OpenBSM implementation was created by McAfee Research, the security division of McAfee Inc., under contract to Apple Computer Inc. in 2004. It was subsequently adopted by the TrustedBSD Project as the foundation for the OpenBSM distribution. Support for kernel AUTHORSThis software was created by McAfee Research, the security research division of McAfee, Inc., under contract to Apple Computer Inc. Additional authors include Wayne Salamon, Robert Watson, and SPARTA Inc. The Basic Security Module (BSM) interface to audit records and audit event stream format were defined by Sun Microsystems. This manual page was written by Robert Watson <rwatson@FreeBSD.org>. BUGSThe FreeBSD kernel does not fully validate that audit records submitted by user applications are syntactically valid BSM; as submission of records is limited to privileged processes, this is not a critical bug. Instrumentation of auditable events in the kernel is not complete, as some system calls do not generate audit records, or generate audit records with incomplete argument information. Mandatory Access Control (MAC) labels, as provided by the mac(4) facility, are not audited as part of records involving MAC decisions. Currently the
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